Recent dramatic events have confronted us with the new and the unexpected, often in a dramatic way. We have then shaken ourselves, taking uncertain steps from different perspectives, we have narrated different stories, in the urgent search for explanations and justifications, in the effort to attempt solutions, in a more or less convincing way, to face contrasting emotional states. The stories – narratives – that we have analyzed previously have highlighted an interesting aspect that distinguishes us: sometimes people react differently to identical situations, other times they live in a similar way when faced with the need to face different events. Sometimes the explanations and narratives of these experiences are very dissimilar from each other; this may depend on different attitudes and emotions that run through what we experience, but it may also derive from the fact that we do not know well how to attribute meanings and causes to unexpected events, characterized by a complexity that we struggle to contemplate in all its dimensions.
One root of these difficulties can be traced to an impasse related to knowledge: we know that something excessive and unexpected is emerging, but we do not understand exactly what it is, we do not know how to investigate/observe to understand what is happening to us; we lack the categories. A second aspect related to this difficulty concerns the adoption of an appropriate methodology: faced with complexity, what is the most suitable observation method? In this regard, Joel De Rosnay argues, in summary, that:
- complexity is the prevalent structural characteristic of man-made social organisms,
- man has proven incapable of exercising complete dominion over both the instruments of investigation and the nature that these instruments are supposed to reveal,
- the current cognitive crisis is therefore fundamentally methodological, in the sense that it is necessary to search for new methods of approaching complex problems,
- we need methods, understood in the most general sense as tools capable of governing the two fundamental moments in which the author identifies the exploratory action of the human being: the definition of a theory and its application in real contexts.
De Rosnay presents an approach to complexity through a metaphor that has the merit of being clear and specific: “microscope, telescope: the words evoke the great explorations of science towards the infinitely small and towards the infinitely large. The microscope has allowed a dizzying dive into the depths of the living. [..] The telescope has opened minds to the immensity of the cosmos. Today we are confronted with another infinity, the infinitely complex. Without instruments, this time. Nothing: only a naked brain, an intelligence and a logic without weapons, faced with the immense complexity of life and society. [..] We need a precious instrument like the microscope and the telescope were for the scientific knowledge of the universe, but this time intended for all those who try to understand the meaning and place of their activities. [..] I will call this tool the macroscope (macro, large; skopein, to observe). The macroscope is not a tool like the others, it is a symbolic instrument, a set of methods and techniques inspired by the most varied disciplines. The macroscope can be considered the symbol of a new way of seeing, understanding and acting”.
The problem of the observational method was raised, in more recent years, by Timothy Morton, to address the complex problems of ecology and (sustainability), attempting to understand and measure them. The philosopher uses research related to the infinitely small (quantum theory) to identify new methodological aspects useful for investigating macroscopic phenomena: “observation is part of the universe of objects, as much as the observable – it is not an ontologically peculiar state – (for example, a subject). More generally, what Bohr called the principle of complementarity ensures that no quantum can have total access to any other quantum. Just as the lens of a microscope makes one object appear sharper and blurs others, the variable relating to a quantum becomes sharp at the expense of other variables. [..] For Bohr, quantum phenomena are not simply linked to their measuring devices, they are identical to them. The measuring instruments and the phenomena measured form an indivisible whole. [..] Reality cannot be considered a machine. [..] The classical idea of the separability of the world into discrete but interacting units is no longer valid or relevant. [..] And this may be even more true for the levels of higher realities, those of the evolution of biology and ecology”.
The lesson we draw from the methodological observations made by De Rosney first and Morton more than forty years later is pregnant with consequences when we set ourselves the goal of giving substance to a restorative approach to (sustainability). Both approaches refer to an indivisible complexity: the interaction of such intricate and complex phenomena cannot be composed, resolved; we must face them through a new perspective. We must equip ourselves with a new epistemology or, perhaps, we must give up epistemology itself. Secondly, phenomena cannot be explained through the classical scientific method, under penalty of the degradation of what we are observing. In other words, if we observe a complex manifestation through the lens of the classical method, what we will observe will not be what we want to observe (explain, understand, etc.) but something else. To observe (explain, understand, etc.) a complex system – or an emerging phenomenon – it is necessary to adopt methods that in themselves take into due account the irreducibility of what we have in front of us.
- Similarly, when we construct our own personal narrative, we must ask ourselves: what are the tools, cognitive and otherwise, that we use to create stories that we believe in?
- What are the “dark corners” that don’t appear in our stories?
J. De Rosnay, The Macroscope, towards a global vision, Dedalo
J. De Rosnay, ibid.
T. Morton, Hyperobjects, Black ed.
T. Morton, ibid.
